L’objectif de cet article est d’évaluer si la Responsabilité Elargie du Producteur appliquée aux emballages ménagers fournit les incitations adéquates à la réduction à la source des emballages. La théorie économique prédit que le niveau d’incitation socialement efficace sera obtenu si l’écocontribution versée par chaque conditionneur à l’éco-organisme Citéo est égale au coût externe des emballages qu’il met sur le marché, entendu comme la somme du coût économique de traitement des déchets générés et de son coût environnemental. A l’aide de données de l’ADEME, de Citéo, de CE Delft et du WWF, nous montrons que les écocontributions n’internalisent que 43 % du coût externe, ce qui correspond à un coût non internalisé proche de 900 millions d’euros par an. A des degrés divers, tous les matériaux contribuent au déficit. L’acier est toutefois le plus grand contributeur devant le plastique et le verre. En outre, les taux appliqués aux différents matériaux ne sont pas en cohérence avec les coûts économiques de leur fin de vie et leur impacts environnementaux Ainsi l’écocontribution payée pour un emballage en verre ne représente que 12% de son coût externe, loin derrière le plastique (63 %) et le papier-carton (62%). Le dispositif conduit alors à des efforts d’écoconception trop modestes et dans des directions qui vont à l’encontre de la réduction du coût économique et environnemental des déchets d’emballages. Ces éléments fournissent des éléments pour réformer le barème de la REP emballages au profit de la réduction à la source.
In 2018, the EU Court of Justice ruled that gene edited organisms “are GMOs and are, in principle, subject to the obligations laid down by the GMO directive [EU Directive 2001/18/EC]”. While the EU Court of Justice has established an equivalence between gene edited organisms and GMOs, how have national institutions and committees from EU member states positioned themselves regarding the use of gene editing in agriculture? In order to answer this question, this article examines and compares 11 official reports and position statements from 7 European countries: Germany, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Denmark, and Sweden. The various kinds of issues that are addressed and arguments that are made in the reports are coded into large categories (innovation, risk, ethics, legislation, etc.) and are analysed. The paper discusses the main similarities and differences in terms of how the governance of gene editing is problematized. For instance, while some reports consider gene editing in terms of technology, risk and regulation, others situate gene editing within larger debates about agriculture, intellectual property, ethics, public participation, and the responsibility of scientists. The paper aims to provide a useful resource to broaden debates on the future regulation of gene editing within and beyond Europe. It also calls for an analysis of the objectification of gene editing: how are gene edited organisms rendered tangible, discussable and public via policy processes? How are they tied to national territories, identities, histories or products and how does this (re)nationalizing of gene edited organisms matter within and beyond EU member states?
This paper examines current controversies around the use of gene editing on human embryos. Gene editing techniques (such as CRISPR/Cas9) have raised numerous questions to do with governance, security, control, legislation, regulation, ethics, responsibility, and economics. While the controversy around CRISPR/Cas9 is multifaceted and multi-layered, I focus in this paper on one key issue, namely the characterizations of, and demarcations between, responsible research and irresponsible research.
We examine the effect of Intellectual property rights (IPR) protection on the two main channels of international transfer of low-carbon technologies i.e. trade in low-carbon capital goods, and foreign direct investments (FDI) by firms producing low-carbon technologies. Our data describes cross-country transfer through these channels between developing and developed countries in eight climate-related technology fields from 2006 to 2015. At the world level, we find that strengthening IPR protection increases transfer in six technology fields (solar PV, solar thermal, wind power, heating, lighting, and cleaner vehicles), while the effect is statistically insignificant in the others. However, when focusing on non-OECD countries, we find that a stricter IPR does not influence trade in low-carbon capital goods but is a significant determinant of inward FDI for most low-carbon technologies. These results have important implications for climate negotiations on North-South technology transfer. (revised Feb. 2019)
This paper focuses on the relationships between innovation and democracy at city level. Focusing on the case of San Francisco, it discusses a particular way of imagining the city in the terms of permanent innovation. In the city of permanent innovation, individual urban problems are to be solved by a permanent supply of technological solutions. Imagining the city in those terms has political implications, pertaining to the representation of social groups and public concerns on the one hand, to the public interventions deemed legitimate on the other hand. We contend that the democratic ordering at play in the city of permanent innovation is based on the permanent reconstruction of social identities, and on local experimental interventions. In San Francisco, these forms of urban action are controversial. Proponents of interest-based democratic politics and anti-eviction activists voice counter-propositions for the definition of urban democracy. By contrast, these counter-propositions help us characterize the political project of the city of permanent innovation, which we label real-time democracy.
This paper studies the impact of age and reactor technology on safety in the French nuclear fleet between 1997 and 2015. We use a novel dataset encompassing over 19,000 nuclear safety events declared by plant managers to the French regulatory agency. A major problem for evaluating the effects of age and technology is that declarations of safety events are influenced by the plant managers’ level of transparency. We deal with this problem by restricting the analysis to the occurrences of particular types of events, such as automatic shut-downs. These events, due to their technical specifics, exhibit perfect detection and declaration rates. We obtain the following results. First, technology has a strong impact on reactor safety. Second, age has a significant and technology-specific effect on reactor safety. For instance, while in 1997 one additional year of age led to a 15% increase in the expected number of automatic shut-downs among the 900 MW reactors, this number was reduced to only 6% in 2014. In comparison, the 1450 MW reactors undergo a significantly larger number of automatic shut-downs, but age has a smaller effect on their rate of occurrence. Finally, we find that local transparency, defined as both detection abilities, reporting behaviours and declaration guidelines, plays a significant role in the explanation of the observed variations of declarations of events.
Using household-level data from the American Housing Survey, this paper assesses the cost of adapting housing to temperature increases. We account for both energy use adjustments and capital adjustments through investments in weatherization and heating and cooling equipment. Our best estimate of the present discounted value of the cost for adapting to the A2 "business-as-usual" climate scenario by the end of the century is $5,600 per housing unit, including both energy and investment costs. A more intense use of air conditioners will be compensated for by a reduction in heating need, leading to a shift from gas to electricity consumption.
Assessing the risks of rare disasters due to the production of energy is paramount when making energy policy decisions. Yet, the costs associated with these risks are most often not calculable due to the high uncertainties that characterize their potential consequences. In this paper, we propose a non-Bayesian method for the calculation of the expected cost of rare energy disasters, that accounts for the ambiguity that characterizes the probabilities of these events. Ambiguity is defined as the existence of multiple and conflicting sources of information regarding the probabilities associated with these events. We then apply this method to the particular case of nuclear accidents in new builds. Our results suggests that the upper-bound of the expected cost of such accidents is 1.7€/MWh, which is consistent with most of the recent estimates. This expected cost may rise to 7€/MWh when the macroeconomic shock caused by a nuclear accident is taken into account.
Because ICT standard frequently incorporate patented inventions, standard setting organizations have designed intellectual property policies whereby the owners of such "standard essential patents" must commit ex ante to license them on fair reasonable and non-discriminatory terms to manufacturers of standard-compliant products. However, these commitments are vague and may not be sufficient to prevent patent hold-up in practice. In this paper, we develop a simple framework to analyze the consequence of ineffective FRAND commitments, and compare them with legally binding commitments on a royalty level or a royalty cap. We show that the cap is systematically preferred by the licensor, while it has ambiguous effects on consumers depending on the licensorís preferred alternative strategy.
L’article interroge la manière dont les investisseurs évaluent les projets entrepreneuriaux disruptifs. Les résultats se fondent sur une série d’entretiens réalisés auprès de plusieurs fonds d’investissement. Cette recherche est l’occasion d’avancer trois résultats. Premièrement, les investisseurs ne semblent pas s’accorder sur la signification à donner au concept de disruption. Deuxièmement, les projets disruptifs sont évalués au moyen de méthodes quasi-équivalentes à celles mises en œuvre pour juger de lapertinence de projets plus classiques. Troisièmement, les projets disruptifs financés donnent souvent lieu à des modalités d’investissement atypiques.